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ABSTRACT
We generalize AGM belief revision theory to the multi-agent
case. To do so, we first generalize the semantics of the single-
agent case, based on the notion of interpretation, to the
multi-agent case. Then we show that, thanks to the shape
of our new semantics, all the results of the AGM framework
transfer. Afterwards we investigate some postulates that are
specific to our multi-agent setting.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
I.2.4. [Knowledge Representation Formalism andMeth-
ods]: Modal Logic; I.2.1.1 [Distributed Artificial In-
telligence]: Intelligent Agents, Multi-agent systems; I.2.3
[Deduction and Theorem Proving]: non-monotonic rea-
soning and belief revision
General Terms
Theory
Keywords
Belief revision, Epistemic logic, Multi-agent systems
1. INTRODUCTION
AGM belief revision theory [1] has been designed for a
single agent. It seems natural to extend it to the multi-agent
case. As in AGM, we consider the beliefs of one agent, that
we call Y (like Y ou). But in this case this agent, in her
representation of the surrounding world, will have to deal
not only with facts about the world but also with how the
other agents perceive the surrounding world. So, we will
have to extend or generalize the single agent semantics in
order to take into account this multi-agent aspect. Such a
formalism is crucial if we want to design autonomous agents
able to act in a multi-agent setting.
Besides, in a multi-agent setting, we have to be careful
about what kind of multi-agent belief revision we study and
consequently about the nature of the events we consider. In
this paper we are interested in private announcements made
to Y . A private announcement is an event where Y learns
privately (from an external source for example) some piece
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of information about the original situation, the other agents
not being aware of anything. This piece of information might
be factual or epistemic, i.e. about some other agents’ beliefs.
Finally, by private multi-agent belief revision, we mean the
revision that Y must perform in case the private announce-
ment of ϕ made to her contradicts her beliefs. So far, this
kind of revision has not been studied.
In the case of private announcement, the other agents’
belief clearly do not change. For example, suppose you (Y )
believe p, and agent j believes p (and perhaps even that p
is common belief of Y and j). When a third external agent
privately tells you that ¬p then j still believes p and you still
believe that j believes p (and that j believes that p is com-
mon belief). This static aspect of private announcements
is similar to the static aspect of AGM belief revision in a
single-agent case: in both cases the world does not change
but only agent Y ’s beliefs about the world change. So, it is
reasonable to expect that the AGM framework can be ex-
tended to private multi-agent belief revision. In this paper
we propose a natural generalization. The central device will
be internal models, of which AGM models are a particular
case.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we recall
belief revision theory in the line of [8]. In Section 3, we
first introduce the notions of multi-agent possible worlds and
internal models in order to adequately represent agent Y ’s
perception of the surrounding world. We also propose an
equivalent representation. Then we generalize the results of
Section 2 to the multi-agent case. Finally in Section 4, we
investigate some additional rationality postulates specific to
our multi-agent approach.
2. THE SINGLE AGENT CASE: THE AGM
APPROACH
In this paper Φ is a finite set of propositional letters and L
the propositional language defined over Φ. Often, the epis-
temic state of the agent at stake is represented by a belief
set K. This belief set is an infinite set of propositional for-
mulas closed under logical consequence and whose formulas
represent the beliefs of the agent. However, we prefer to
represent epistemic states by finite belief base as it is easier
to handle by computers. For that, we follow the approach
of [8].
As argued by Katsuno and Mendelzon, because Φ is finite,
a belief set K can be equivalently represented by a mere
propositional formula ψ: K = Cn(ψ) = {ϕ;ψ → ϕ}. So
ϕ ∈ K iff ψ → ϕ. Now, given a belief base ψ and a sentence
µ, ψ ◦ µ denotes the revision of ψ by µ; that is the new
belief base obtained by adding µ to the old belief base ψ
and giving up some formulas if necessary to keep consistency.
In fact, given a revision operator ∗ on belief sets, one can
define a corresponding operator ◦ on belief bases as follows:
ψ ◦µ→ ϕ iff ϕ ∈ Cn(ψ)∗µ. Thanks to this correspondence,
Katsuno and Mendelzon set some rationality postulates for
this revision operator ◦ on belief bases which are equivalent
to the AGM rationality postulates for the revision ∗ on belief
sets. These postulates express how a rational agent should
revise her belief set when she receives incoming information
that she believes to be true.
Lemma 1. [8] Let * be a revision operator on belief sets
and ◦ its corresponding operator on belief bases. Then *
satisfies the 8 AGM postulates (K ∗1)− (K ∗8) iff ◦ satisfies
the postulates (R1)− (R6) below:
(R1) ψ ◦ µ→ µ.
(R2) if ψ ∧ µ is satisfiable, then ψ ◦ µ↔ ψ ∧ µ.
(R3) If µ is satisfiable, then ψ ◦ µ is also satisfiable.
(R4) If ψ1 ↔ ψ2 and µ1 ↔ µ2, then ψ1 ◦ µ1 ↔ ψ2 ◦ µ2.
(R5) (ψ ◦ µ) ∧ ϕ→ ψ ◦ (µ ∧ ϕ).
(R6) If (ψ◦µ)∧ϕ is satisfiable, then ψ◦(µ∧ϕ)→ (ψ◦µ)∧ϕ.
So far our approach to revision was syntactically driven.
Now we are going to give a semantical approach to revision
and then set some links between the two approaches.
Let I be the set of all the interpretations of the finite
propositional language L. Mod(ψ) denotes the set of all
the interpretations that make ψ true. Let M be a set of
interpretations of L. form(M) denotes a formula whose set
of models is equal to M.
A pre-order ≤ over I is a reflexive and transitive rela-
tion on I. A pre-order is total if for every I, J ∈ I, either
I ≤ J or J ≤ I. Consider a function that assigns to each
propositional formula ψ a pre-order ≤ψ over I. We say this
assignment is faithful if the following three conditions hold:
1. If I, I ′ ∈Mod(ψ), then I <ψ I ′ does not hold.
2. If I ∈Mod(ψ) and I ′ /∈Mod(ψ), then I <ψ I ′ holds.
3. If ψ ↔ ϕ, then ≤ψ=≤ϕ.
Let M be a subset of I. An interpretation I is minimal
in M with respect to ≤ψ if I ∈ M and there is no I ′ ∈ M
such that I ′ <ψ I. Let
Min(M,≤ψ) := {I; I is minimal inM with respect to ≤ψ}
Theorem 1. [8] Revision operator ◦ satisfies postulates
(R1)− (R6) iff there exists a faithful assignment that maps
each belief base ψ to a total pre-order ≤ψ such that Mod(ψ ◦
µ) =Min(Mod(µ),≤ψ).
Proof. The detailed proof can be found in [8], we just
give a sketch of it here. The “if” direction is straightfor-
ward. For the “only-if” direction, the key is the definition
of a faithful assignment for each belief base in terms of ◦.
For any interpretations I and I ′ (I = I ′is permitted), we
define a relation ≤ψ as I ≤ψ I ′ iff either I ∈ Mod(ψ) or
I ∈Mod(ψ ◦ form(I, I ′)).
3. THE MULTI-AGENT CASE
3.1 Some Technical Preliminaries
In this paper, G is a fixed set of agents such that Y ∈ G.
3.1.1 Epistemic logic
We first recall the basics of epistemic logic. An epistemic
modelM is a tupleM = (W, {Rj ; j ∈ G}, val) where W is a
set of worlds, Rj are accessibility relations indexed by agents
j ∈ G and val is a function that assigns to each w ∈ W
a subset of Φ. We define Rj(w) by Rj(w) := {v;wRjv}
and |M | is the number of worlds in M . Finally, a KD45G
epistemic model is an epistemic model whose accessibility
relations are serial, transitive and euclidean.1
Classically, an epistemic model M is given with an ac-
tual world wa: (M,wa). Intuitively, a (pointed) epistemic
model (M,wa) represents from an external point of view
how the actual world wa is perceived by the agents G. The
possible worlds W are the relevant worlds needed to define
such a representation and the valuation val specifies which
propositional letters (such as ‘it is raining’) are true in these
worlds. Finally the accessibility relations Rj models the no-
tion of belief. We set w′ ∈ Rj(w) in case in world w, agent
j considers the world w′ possible.
Now we can define a language for epistemic models which
will enable us to express things about them.
L : ϕ ::= > | p | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∧ ϕ | Bjϕ | CG1ϕ,
where j ranges over G, G1 over subsets of G and p over
Φ. Its semantics is defined as usual as follows.
M,w |= >
M,w |= p iff w ∈ V (p)
M,w |= ¬ϕ iff not M,w |= ϕ
M,w |= ϕ ∧ ϕ′ iff M,w |= ϕ and M,w |= ϕ′
M,w |= Bjϕ iff for all v ∈ Rj(w),M, v |= ϕ
M,w |= CG1ϕ iff for all v ∈ (
⋃
j∈G1
Rj)
+(w)M, v |= ϕ
where (
⋃
j∈G1
Rj)
+ is the transitive closure of
⋃
j∈G1
Rj .
M,w |= Bjϕ intuitively means that in world w, agent j
believes that ϕ is true (because ϕ is true in all the worlds
that the agent j considers possible). For example, in the
pointed epistemic model (M,w) of Figure 4, agent Y does
not know whether p is true or not: M,w |= ¬BY p∧¬BY ¬p.
Agent Y also believes that A does not know neither: M,w |=
BY (¬BAp ∧ ¬BA¬p). Finally, agent Y believes that A be-
lieves that she does not know whether p is true or not:
M,w |= BYBA(¬BY ¬p ∧ ¬BY p). M,w |= CG1ϕ intuitively
means that in world w, ϕ is common belief among the agents
G1, that is to say every agent of G1 believes ϕ, and every
agent of G1 believes that every agent of G1 believes ϕ... and
so on ad infinitum. For example, in the pointed epistemic
model (M,w) of Figure 4, it is common belief among all the
agents that agent Y does not know whether p is true or not:
M,w |= CG(¬BY p ∧ ¬BY ¬p).
1An accessibility relation R is
• serial if for all w, R(w) 6= ∅;
• transitive if for all w, v, u, if wRv and vRu then wRu;
• euclidean if for all w, v, u, if wRv and wRu then vRu.
3.1.2 Bisimulation
We now recall the definition of a bisimulation. Intuitively,
two epistemic models are bisimilar if they contain the same
information.
Definition 1. Let Z be a relation between worlds of two
finite epistemic modelsM = (W, {Rj ; j ∈ G}, val) andM ′ =
(W ′, {R′j ; j ∈ G}, val′). We define the property of Z being
a bisimulation in w and w′, noted Z : M,w - M ′, w′ as
follows.
1. If wZw′ then val(w) = val′(w′);
2. if wZw′ and v ∈ Rj(w) then there exists v′ ∈ Rj(w′)
such that vZv′;
3. if wZw′ and v′ ∈ Rj(w′ then there exists v ∈ Rj(w)
such that vZv′.
We can define bisimilarity betweenM,w andM ′, w′, noted
M,w - M ′, w′ by M,w - M ′, w′ iff there is a relation Z
such that Z : M,w - M ′, w′. It can be shown (in case M
and M ′ are finite) that M,w - M ′, w′ iff for all ϕ ∈ L,
M,w |= ϕ iff M ′, w′ |= ϕ.
3.1.3 Characterization of finite models
Finally, we will also use the following proposition.
Proposition 1. [3][10] LetM be a finite epistemic model
and w ∈M . Then there is an epistemic formula δM (w) (in-
volving common knowledge) such that
1. M,w |= δM (w)
2. For every finite epistemic model M ′ and world w′ ∈
M ′, if M ′, w′ |= δM (w) then M,w -M ′, w′.
This proposition tells us that a finite epistemic model
can be completely characterized (modulo bisimulation) by
an epistemic formula. For example, the pointed epistemic
model (M,w) in Figure 4 (on page 3) is characterized by
the following epistemic formula: δM (w) := p ∧ (¬BY p ∧
¬BY ¬p)∧(¬BAp∧¬BA¬p)∧CG((¬BY p∧¬BY ¬p)∧(¬BAp∧
¬BA¬p)).
This proposition will be very useful to prove that the re-
sults of the single agent case transfer to the multi-agent
case2.
3.2 From Possible World to Multi-agent Pos-
sible World
3.2.1 The notion of multi-agent possible world
In the AGM framework, one considers a single agent Y .
The possible worlds introduced are supposed to represent
how the agent Y perceives the surrounding world. Because
she is the only agent, these possible worlds deal only with
propositional facts about the surrounding world. Now, be-
cause we suppose that there are other agents than agent Y ,
a possible world for Y in that case should also deal with
how the other agents perceive the surrounding world. These
“multi-agent”possible worlds should then not only deal with
propositional facts but also with epistemic facts. So to rep-
resent a multi-agent possible world we need to introduce a
modal structure to our possible worlds. We do so as follows.
2Note that van Benthem, in [10], already mentioned that
this proposition could be used in belief revision theory
a (single-agent) possible world:
w : p,¬q
a multi-agent possible world:
w′ : p,¬q
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Figure 1: From possible world to multi-agent possi-
ble world
Definition 2. A multi-agent possible world (M,w) is a
finite epistemic model M = (W, {Rj ; j ∈ G}, val) such that
for all j, Rj is serial, transitive and euclidean, and
• RY (w) = {w};
• there is no v and j 6= Y such that w ∈ Rj(v).
Let us have a closer look at the definition. The second
condition will be motivated in the next section. The first
condition ensures us that in case Y is the only agent then a
multi-agent possible world boils down to an interpretation,
as in the AGM theory. The first condition also ensures us
that in case Y assumes that she is in the multi-agent possi-
ble world (M,w) then for her w is the only possible world.
In fact the other possible worlds of a multi-agent possible
world are just present for technical reasons: they express
the other agents’ beliefs (in world w). Note that if we re-
move the constraints on the accessibility relations (seriality,
euclidicity and transitivity) the results in this paper are still
valid. We prefer to keep them because we find them more in-
tuitive to model the notion of belief construed as conviction.
Intuitively, this notion of belief corresponds for example to
the kind of belief in a theorem that you have after having
proved this theorem and checked the proof several times. In
the literature, this notion of belief corresponds to Lenzen’s
notion of conviction [9] or to Ga¨rdenfors’ notion of accep-
tance [6] or to Voorbraak’s notion of rational introspective
belief [12].
We see in Figure 1 that a multi-agent possible world is
really a generalization of a possible world (or interpretation).
In both of them agent Y believes that p is true and q is false.
But in the multi-agent possible world we can also express
what (agent Y ’s beliefs about) the other agents’ beliefs are.
For example, (agent Y believes that) agent A believes that q
is true (BAq) or agent B believes that agent Y believes that
p is false (BBBY ¬p). Inspiring ourselves from the AGM
theory we can then define the notion of internal model.
Definition 3. An internal model is a finite and disjoint
union of multi-agent possible worlds.
Note that in the single-agent case, an internal model boils
down to a (non-empty) set of interpretations, so represents a
belief set. Intuitively, an internal model is the formal model
that agent Y has “in her head” and that represents how she
perceives the surrounding world. This interpretation differs
from Hintikka epistemic models (M,wa), usually encoun-
tered in epistemic logic, which are supposed to represent
objectively and from an external point of view how all the
agents perceive the actual world wa.
Example 1. In Figure 2 is depicted an example of internal
model. In this internal model, the agent Y does not know
wether p is true or not (formally ¬BY p ∧ ¬BY ¬p). Indeed,
M1, w |= p and M2, v |= ¬p. The agent Y also believes
that the agent A does not know whether p is true or false
(formally BY (¬BAp ∧ ¬BA¬p)). Indeed, M1, w |= ¬BAp ∧
¬BA¬p and M2, v |= ¬BAp ∧ ¬BA¬p. Finally, the agent
Y believes that A believes that she does not know whether
p is true or false (formally BYBA(¬BY p ∧ ¬BY ¬p)) since
M1, w |= BA(¬BY p ∧ ¬BY ¬p) and M2, v |= BA(¬BY p ∧
¬BY ¬p).
3.2.2 Alternative representation of internal models
Definition 4. Let {(M1, w1), . . . , (Mn, wn)} be an inter-
nal model. The epistemic model associated with {(M1, w1),
. . . , (Mn, wn)} is the KD45G epistemic modelM = (W, {Rj ;
j ∈ G}, val) defined as follows.
• W :=W1 ∪ . . . ∪Wn;
• Rj := R1j ∪ . . . ∪Rnj for j 6= Y ;
• RY := R1Y ∪ . . . ∪RnY ∪ {(wi, wk); i, k = 1 . . . n};
• val(w) := vali(w) if w ∈Wi.
Example 2. In Figure 2 is represented the internal model
{(M1, w), (M2, v)} and in Figure 4 is represented an epis-
temic model bisimilar to the epistemic model associated to
{(M1, w), (M2, v)} of Figure 3.
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Figure 2: An internal model : multi-agent possible
world (M1, w) (left) and multi-agent possible world
(M2, v) (right)
We can now motivate the second item of Definition 2. In-
deed, if this item was not fulfilled then part of the agents
j’s beliefs about Y ’s beliefs (for j 6= Y ) would depend on
the other multi-agent possible worlds of the internal model.
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Figure 3: Epistemic model associated to the internal
model {(M1, w), (M2, v)}
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Figure 4: Epistemic model bisimilar to the epistemic
model of Figure 3
This aspect of the notion of internal model is revealed when
we define the notion of epistemic model associated to an
internal model. Condition 2 ensures us that the agents j’s
beliefs in a multi-agent possible world of a given internal
model depend only on the structure of this multi-agent pos-
sible world. Condition 2 thus provides a kind of modularity
to multi-agent possible worlds that will be useful in the se-
quel.
For every internal model, the epistemic model associated
to this internal model is a KD45G epistemic model gener-
ated by RY (w) (for some world w of this epistemic model).
The other way round, one can easily show that any KD45G
epistemic model generated from RY (w) (for some world w
of this epistemic model) can be equivalently represented by
an internal model3. So we have two equivalent ways to rep-
resent the epistemic state of agent Y .
The second type of representation is much closer to usual
epistemic models of standard epistemic logic. But we stress
that the interpretation of our models are different from the
interpretation of epistemic models in standard epistemic logic.
Our models are built by agent Y in order to represent for
herself the surrounding world, whereas the models of epis-
temic logic are built by an external modeler and represent
truthfully how each agent perceives the actual world.
Besides, the shape of internal models, based on the notion
of multi-agent possible world, allows to generalize easily con-
cepts and methods from AGM belief revision theory, as we
will now see.
3.3 The Multi-agent Generalization of the AGM
Approach
In the multi-agent case like in the single-agent case, it does
not make any sense to revise by formulas dealing with what
the agent Y believes or considers possible. Indeed, due to
the fact that positive and negative introspection are valid in
KD45, Y already knows all she believes and all she disbe-
3This equivalence could be easily specified formally by stat-
ing that for all i and ϕ ∈ L 6=Y , M,wi |= ϕ iff Mi, wi |= ϕ,
where L6=Y is defined in Definition 5.
lieves. So we restrict the epistemic language to a fragment
that we call L 6=Y defined as follows.
Definition 5.
L6=Y : ϕ ::= > | p | Bjψ | ϕ ∧ ϕ | ¬ϕ,
where p ranges over Φ, ψ ranges over L and j over G −
{Y }.
We can then apply with some slight modifications the pro-
cedure spelled out for the single agent case in Section 2.
First the postulates for multi-agent belief revision are iden-
tical to the ones spelled out in Lemma 1 but this time ψ, µ
and ϕ belong to L 6=Y .
Now we define IG to be the set of all multi-agent possible
worlds modulo bisimulation; more precisely IG is made of
the smallest multi-agent possible world among each class
of bisimilarly indistinguishable multi-agent possible worlds.
We define Mod(ψ) by Mod(ψ) := {(M,w) ∈ IG; M,w |=
ψ}. Let M be an internal model. Thanks to Proposition 1
we can easily prove that
Fact (*) there is a formula form(M) ∈ L 6=Y such that
Mod(form(M)) =M.
Proof. Let (M,w) be a multi-agent possible world. Then
we set δ∗M (w) :=
∧
p∈val(w)
p ∧ ∧
p/∈val(w)
¬p ∧ ∧
j∈G−{Y }( ∧
v∈Rj(w)
¬Bj¬δM (v) ∧Bj
( ∨
v∈Rj(w)
δM (v)
))
. Clearly
δ∗M (w) ∈ L 6=Y and M,w |= δ∗M (w). Besides, for all multi-
agent possible world (M ′, w′) ∈ IG, if M ′, w′ |= δ∗M (w) then
M,w - M ′, w′ by applying Proposition 1; so (M,w) =
(M ′, w′) by definition of IG. Let M := {(M1, w1), . . . ,
(Mn, wn)}. We set form(M) := δ∗M1(w1) ∨ . . . ∨ δ∗Mn(wn).
Then form(M) ∈ L 6=Y and Mod(form(M)) =M.
The proof of this fact is made possible because of the mod-
ularity of multi-agent possible worlds enforced by condition
2 in our definition of multi-agent possible world. Therefore,
this is another motivation for this condition.
We then get the multi-agent generalization of Theorem 1
by replacing interpretations I by multi-agent possible worlds
(M,w).
Theorem 2. Revision operator ◦ on L6=Y satisfies condi-
tions (R1) − (R6) iff there exists a faithful assignment that
maps each belief base ψ to a total pre-order ≤ψ defined on
IG such that Mod(ψ ◦ µ) =Min(Mod(µ),≤ψ).
Proof. The proof follows the line of that of Theorem 1.
It relies heavily on the fact (*).
The “if” direction is straightforward. For the “only-if”
direction, the key is the definition of a faithful assignment for
each belief base in terms of ◦. For any multi-agent possible
world (M,w) and (M ′, w′) ((M,w) = (M ′, w′)is permitted),
we define a relation ≤ψ as (M,w) ≤ψ (M ′, w′) iff either
(M,w) ∈Mod(ψ)
or (M,w) ∈Mod(ψ ◦ form({(M,w), (M ′, w′)})).
This definition of the assignment is identical to the single
agent case.
Remark 1. We have picked only one of the theorems of
[8] but in fact all the theorems present in [8] transfer to the
multi-agent case. It includes in particular the theorem about
≤ψ being a partial order instead of a total order.
In summary, the concept of internal model (more precisely
of multi-agent possible world) allows for a straightforward
transfer of the AGM framework and results.
4. SOME CONSIDERATIONS SPECIFIC TO
OUR MULTI-AGENT APPROACH
In this section we are going to investigate some multi-
agent rationality postulates. Indeed, because we add a multi-
agent structure to our possible worlds, it is natural to study
how (agent Y ’s beliefs about) the other agents’ beliefs evolve
during a revision process.
As said in the introduction, the events we study are pri-
vate announcement made to Y , the other agents not being
aware of anything. So, unlike public announcements, the
beliefs of the other agents actually do not change and agent
Y knows this. Consequently, agent Y ’s beliefs about the
agents who are not concerned by the formula announced to
her should not change as well. So, first of all, we need to
define formally what are the agents who are concerned by a
formula.
4.1 On the kind of information a formula is
about
First note that an input may not only concern agents but
also the objective state of nature, i.e. propositional facts,
that we note pf and that we will consider as a “Nature”
agent. For example, the formula p∧BjBi¬p concerns agent
j’s beliefs but also propositional facts (namely p). Besides,
a formula cannot be about Y ’s beliefs because ϕ ∈ L 6=Y by
assumption. So what an input is about includes proposi-
tional facts but excludes agent Y ’s beliefs. This leads us to
the following definition.
Definition 6. Let C0 := (G ∪ {pf})− {Y }.
We define by induction the agents who are concerned by
a formula as follows:
• C(p) := pf; C(Bjϕ) := {j}; C(CG1ϕ) := G1;
• C(¬ϕ) := C(ϕ); C(ϕ ∧ ϕ′) := C(ϕ) ∪ C(ϕ′).
For example, C(p ∨ (q ∧BjBir) ∧Bkr)) = {pf, j, k}, and
C(Bip ∨BjBk¬p) = {i, j}.
We then define a language LC1 whose formulas concern
only agents in C1, and possibly propositional facts if pf ∈
C1.
Definition 7. Let C1 ⊆ C0. We define the language LC1
as follows.
ϕ := > | A | Bjψ | ϕ ∧ ϕ | ¬ϕ,
where j ranges over C1 and ψ over formulas of L. Besides,
A = Φ if pf ∈ C1 and A = ∅ otherwise.
Now we define a notion supposed to tell us whether two
pointed and finite epistemic models contain the same infor-
mation about some agents’ beliefs and possibly about propo-
sitional facts.
Definition 8. Let C1 ⊆ C0. We say that (M,w) and
(M ′, w′) are C1-bisimilar, noted M,w -C1 M ′, w′, iff
• if pf ∈ C1 then val(w) = val(w′) and
• for all j ∈ C1,
if v ∈ Rj(w) then there is v′ ∈ Rj(w′) such thatM, v -
M ′, v′,
if v′ ∈ Rj(w′) then there is v ∈ Rj(w) such thatM, v -
M ′, v′.
Proposition 2. Let C1 ⊆ C0. Then M,w -C1 M ′, w′
iff for all ϕ ∈ LC1 , M,w |= ϕ iff M ′, w′ |= ϕ.
Proof. We assume that pf ∈ C1, the proof without this
assumption is essentially the same.
Assume M,w -C1 M ′, w′. We are going to prove by in-
duction on ϕ ∈ LC1 that M,w |= ϕ iff M ′, w′ |= ϕ.
• ϕ := p. As pf ∈ C1, val(w) = val(w′) so M,w |= p iff
M ′, w′ |= p.
• ϕ := ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2, ϕ := ¬ϕ′ work by induction hypothesis.
• ϕ := Bjϕ′, j ∈ C1. Assume M,w |= Bjϕ′ then for all
v ∈ Rj , M, v |= ϕ′ (*). But for all v′ ∈ Rj(w′) there is
v ∈ Rj(w) such that M, v -M ′, v′.
So for all v′ ∈ Rj(w′),M ′, v′ |= ϕ′ by property of
the bisimulation and (*). Finally M ′, w′ |= Bjϕ′, i.e.
M ′, w′ |= ϕ.
The other way around we could show that if M ′, w′ |=
Bjϕ then M,w |= Bjϕ.
Assume that for all ϕ ∈ LC1 , M,w |= ϕ iff M ′, w′ |= ϕ
(*)
• clearly val(w) = val(w′)
• Let j ∈ C1 and v ∈ Rj(w).
Assume for all v′ ∈ Rj(w′) it is not the case that
M, v -M ′, v′ (**).
Then for all v′ ∈ Rj(w′) there is ϕ(v′) ∈ L such that
M, v |= ¬ϕ(v′) and M ′, v′ |= ϕ(v′).
Let ϕ(w′) := Bj
( ∨
v′∈Rj(w′)
ϕ(v′)
)
; then ϕ(w′) ∈ LC1 .
Besides M ′, w′ |= ϕ(w′) but M,w |= ¬ϕ(w′). This is
impossible by (*), so (**) is false.
The other part of the definition of -C1 is proved sim-
ilarly.
Proposition 2 ensures us that the notion we just defined
captures what we wanted. Its proof uses that the models are
finite (otherwise the if direction would not hold). We then
have a counterpart of Proposition 1.
Proposition 3. Let C1 ⊆ C0, let M be a finite epistemic
models and w ∈M . Then there is δC1M (w) such that
1. M,w |= δC1M (w);
2. for every finite epistemic model M ′ and world w′ ∈
M ′, if M ′, w′ |= δC1M then M,w -C1 M ′, w′.
Proof sketch. If pf ∈ C1, take
δC1M :=
∧
p∈V (w)
p ∧ ∧
p/∈V (w)
¬p ∧ ∧
j∈C1( ∧
v∈Rj(w)
¬Bj¬δM (v) ∧Bj
( ∨
v∈Rj(w)
δM (v)
))
otherwise if pf /∈ C1, take
δC1M :=
∧
j∈C1
( ∧
v∈Rj(w)
¬Bj¬δM (v) ∧Bj ∨
v∈Rj(w)
δM (v)
)
.
Definition 9. Let M and M′ be two sets of multi-agent
possible worlds, we set M -C1 M′ iff for all (M,w) ∈ M
there is (M ′, w′) ∈ M′ such that M,w -C1 M ′, w′, and for
all (M ′, w′) ∈M′ there is (M,w) ∈M such that M,w -C1
M ′, w′.
4.2 Some Postulates Specific to our Multi-agent
Approach
As we said before, we study private announcement made
to Y , the other agents not being aware of anything. So, in
particular, Y ’s beliefs about the beliefs of the agents who
are not concerned by the formula should not change. This
can be captured by the following postulate:
(R7) Let ϕ,ϕ′ ∈ L 6=Y such that C(ϕ) ∩ C(ϕ′) = ∅.
If ψ → ϕ′ then (ψ ◦ ϕ)→ ϕ′
This postulate is the multi-agent version of Parikh and
Chopra’s postulate [5]. The example of the introduction
illustrates this postulate: there ϕ = ¬p and ϕ′ = Bjp ∧
BjCGp. Now the semantic counterpart of (R7):
Proposition 4. A revision operator ◦ satisfies (R7) iff
for all ϕ ∈ L 6=Y , for all (M ′, w′) ∈ Mod(ψ ◦ ϕ) there is
(M,w) ∈ Mod(ψ) such that M,w -C′ M ′, w′, with C′ :=
C0 − C(ϕ).
Proof. The“if”part is straightforward. Let us prove the
“only if” part. Let ϕ ∈ L 6=Y and let (M ′, w′) ∈Mod(ψ ◦ϕ).
Assume that for all (M,w) ∈ Mod(ψ), it is not the case
that M ′, w′ -C′ M,w. Then for all (M,w) ∈ Mod(ψ),
M,w |= ¬δC′M′(w′) by proposition 3. So ψ → ¬δC
′
M′(w
′).
Then ψ ◦ ϕ → ¬δC′M′(w′) by application of (R7). Hence
M ′, w′ |= ¬δC′M′(w′), which is contradictory.
Let us consider the converse of (R7).
(R8) Let ϕ,ϕ′ ∈ L 6=Y such that C(ϕ) ∩ C(ϕ′) = ∅.
If ψ ∧ ϕ′ is satisfiable then (ψ ◦ ϕ) ∧ ϕ′ is satisfiable.
And the semantic counterpart:
Proposition 5. A revision operator ◦ satisfies (R8) iff
for all ϕ ∈ L 6=Y , for all (M,w) ∈Mod(ψ) there is (M ′, w′) ∈
Mod(ψ ◦ ϕ) such that M,w -C′ M ′, w′, with C′ := C0 −
C(ϕ).
Proof. Similar to Proposition 4.
Unlike (R7), (R8) is not really suitable for revision be-
cause all the worlds representing Y ’s epistemic state “sur-
vive” revision process if (R8) is fulfilled. This is not the case
in general because new information can discard some previ-
ous possibilities. This is however the case for update where
we apply the update process to each world independently
(see [7] for an in depth analysis). So (R8) is more suitable
for an update operation.
In fact (R8) can be seen as the multi-agent counterpart
of the propositional update postulate (U8): consider ψ :=
Bip∨Bjp and ϕ := ¬Bip. Then the revised formula is ψ◦ϕ =
Bjp ∧ ¬Bip according to postulate (R2). But according to
postulate (R8), after the revision ¬Bjp should be satisfiable
because ψ ∧ ¬Bjp was satisfiable.
Postulates (R7) and (R8) together are equivalent to: for
all ϕ,ϕ′ ∈ L 6=Y such that C(ϕ) ∩ C(ϕ′) = ∅, ψ → ϕ′ iff
(ψ ◦ ϕ)→ ϕ′. Then
Proposition 6. A revision operator ◦ satisfies (R7) and
(R8) iff for all ϕ ∈ L 6=Y , Mod(ψ) -C′ Mod(ψ ◦ ϕ), with
C′ := C0 − C(ϕ).
Proof. Follows straightforwardly from Proposition 4 and
5.
5. CONCLUSION
We have proposed a semantics to adequately represent the
agent Y ’s perception of the surrounding world in a multi-
agent setting. This semantics generalizes the single agent
one of AGM belief revision theory. Then Proposition 1 has
enabled us to also generalize easily the results of AGM be-
lief revision theory to the multi-agent case. Finally, we have
studied two additional multi-agent postulates that express
more explicitly the fact that we study private announce-
ment.
The power of our approach is that it generalizes all the
results of AGM belief revision theory to the multi-agent case,
and so thanks to the notion of internal model. In fact, if we
consider in particular that there are no other agents than
Y then our approach boils down to classical AGM belief
revision theory.
In the literature of dynamic epistemic logic, there are
works that also deal with private multi-agent belief revi-
sion ([2],[4] or [11] for example). However, their modeling
approach is quite different from ours. The models built in
their work are supposed to represent truthfully the situa-
tion from an external and objective point of view, as it is
usually done in epistemic logic. So they also study private
multi-agent belief revision but from an objective and exter-
nal point of view. On the other hand, our (internal) models
are supposed to be built by agent Y in order to represent for
herself the surrounding world. And our revision techniques
are also intended to be used by agent Y to revise her beliefs.
We claim that our framework is more suitable for designing
autonomous agents.
Finally, it would be interesting to investigate other multi-
agent rationality postulates. Another line of research would
be to study multi-agent update as we have started in Section
4.2. Indeed, the results of [8] about propositional update
transfer to the multi-agent case as well.
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